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PALSGRAF V. LONG ISLAND R.R.: 
 ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
William E. Nelson* 
One of the most important opinions that Benjamin Cardozo 
ever wrote was Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.1 Unfortunately, the 
opinion often is misunderstood.  By placing the Palsgraf decision in 
its historical context, this article seeks to show what Chief Judge 
Cardozo believed his opinion meant and what impact it had over time. 
Throughout the long course of human existence, death, illness 
and injury were a random part of life that could strike tragically at any 
time.  In 1900, for example, nearly one in every 200 people in the 
United States died from influenza and pneumonia, while another one 
in every 200 died from tuberculosis.  Even more deadly was a well-
recorded 1878 yellow fever epidemic in Memphis, Tennessee, which 
produced 5150 fatalities in a total population of 38,500, while 20,000 
deserted the city.2  As one family was starkly described, the mother 
was dead “with her body sprawled across the bed . . . black vomit like 
coffee grounds spattered all over . . . the children rolling on the floor, 
groaning.”3 
Accidents  were  even  more  devastating  than disease.  In the 
nineteenth-century, approximately ten percent of all coal miners died 
in mine accidents during the course of their careers, while at the turn 
of the century one in every 5000 factory employees died annually from 
 
*Edward Weinfeld Professor of Law and Professor of History, New York University. This 
article is excerpted from William E. Nelson, The Legalist Reformation: Law, Politics, and 
Ideology in New York, 1920-1980 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 
2001), 93-107, and is reprinted with permission of the University of North Carolina Press with 
minimal revisions.  
 1   248 N.Y. 339 (1928). 
 2 FREDERICK LEWIS ALLEN, THE BIG CHANGE: AMERICA TRANSFORMS ITSELF, 1900-1950, 
202 (New York: Harper, 1952).  
 3 Quoted in OTTO L. BETTMANN, THE GOOD OLD DAYS—THEY WERE TERRIBLE 136 (New 
York: Random House, 1974).  
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accidents.4  The worst victims of all were railroad employees: in 1901, 
one out of every 399 railroad employees was killed in an accident, 
while 1 out of every 26 was injured.  For train crews in that year, one 
out of every 137 was killed, which translated into a nearly 20% 
probability of accidental death over a 25-year career.5 These high 
accident rates resulted from coupling industry’s “cavalier attitude” that 
“‘[t]here’s a dozen [new workers] waiting when one drops out’” as a 
result of “‘his own bad luck,’”6 with the real “hazards of axles, mules, 
stinging insects, boiling laundry kettles, tetanus-inducing rusty 
implements and barbed wire, impure water, and spoiled food.”7  Given 
the pattern of accidents and illness, it is not surprising that as late as 
1920 average life expectancy in the United States was only 54.1 years.8 
Because of the frequency of workplace accidents and injuries 
involving public transportation, conflict between investors and 
entrepreneurs, on the one hand, and laborers and other ordinary people, 
on the other, was endemic to the law of torts in the early decades of the 
twentieth century.  During this period, the core principle underlying 
classical tort doctrine in New York, like much other common law, was 
the norm outlawing redistribution of wealth or other property. 
In pursuit of this norm, the law enforced the “familiar 
principle[s]”9 first, that a “violation of a legal right knowingly 
committed gives to the injured party a cause of action against the 
wrongdoer”10 and second, “that one who acts must exercise due care 
not to do damage to another’s person or property.”11  “If property [was] 
destroyed or other loss occasioned by a wrongful act, it [was] just that 
the loss should fall upon the estate of the wrongdoer rather than on that 
of a guiltless person.”12 
On the other hand, it stood “to reason that a person [could] not 
recover . . . [for] an inevitable accident. There [were] plenty of 
misfortunes to which people [were] subjected where they must suffer 
 
4 YAIR AHARONI, THE NO-RISK SOCIETY 47 (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1981).  
5 ALLEN, BIG CHANGE, supra note 2, at 56. 
6 BETTMANN, GOOD OLD DAYS, supra note 3, at 71. 
7 Quoted in WILLIAM M. LOWRANCE, OF ACCIDENTAL RISK: SCIENCE IN THE 
DETERMINATION OF SAFETY 5 (Los Altos, Calif.: W. Kaufmann, 1976).  
8 AHARONI, NO-RISK SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 47. 
9 The No. 1 of New York, 61 F.2d 783, 784 (2d Cir. 1932). 
10 Bolivar v. Monnat, 248 N.Y.S. 722, 729 (App. Div. 1931).  
11 The No. 1 of New York, 61 F.2d at 784.  
12 Rozell v. Rozell, 8 N.Y.S.2d 901, 904 (App. Div.), aff’d, 281 N.Y. 106 (1939). 
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without recompense,”13 and courts could not permit “sympathy, 
although one of the noblest sentiments of our nature,” to “decide                              
. . . questions of law” and thereby become a “basis of transferring the 
property of one party to another.”14 As the Court of Appeals had 
proclaimed in one mid-nineteenth century case, everyone in a 
“commercial” country “to some extent” ran the “hazard of his 
neighbor’s conduct.”15 
In short, classical tort doctrine demanded that compensation be 
paid to a person whose injury was caused directly by another’s 
wrongdoing, but not for an injury, however serious, resulting from 
innocent conduct or from causes other than conduct of a defendant. 
Two early cases are illustrative. 
In Laidlaw v. Sage,16 a burglar entered the business premises 
of defendant Russell Sage, demanded $1,200,000 and threatened to set 
off a bomb if he did not receive it.  After he had discussed the matter 
with the burglar, Sage positioned another employee, the plaintiff, 
Laidlaw, between himself and the burglar and then, in essence, refused 
the demand.  When the burglar set off his bomb, Laidlaw was severely 
injured but Sage was saved. Plaintiff recovered a jury verdict against 
Sage, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the bomber had 
caused Laidlaw’s injury and that there was “no evidence in the case of 
any necessary relation of cause and effect” between Sage’s words and 
actions “and the explosion which caused his [Laidlaw’s] injury.”17 
Pardington v. Abraham18 was analogous.  There the defendant 
department store owner maintained a swinging door which another 
customer pushed open, whereupon the door ricochetted back and 
struck and injured Eliza Pardington.  In reversing a jury verdict for 
Pardington, the court found that the doors were no less safe than similar 
doors used in like establishments and that “carelessness in the use of 
any form of door may inflict injury upon one who happens to be 
sufficiently near it.”19 The court continued, “No doubt the plaintiff has 
 
13 Morison v. Broadway & Seventh Ave. R.R., 8 N.Y.S. 436 (Sup. Ct. 1890), quoted in 
RANDOLPH E. BERGSTROM, COURTING DANGER: INJURY AND LAW IN NEW YORK CITY, 1870-
1910, 60 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992).  
14 Laidlaw v. Sage, 158 N.Y. 73, 104 (1899). 
15 Ryan v. New York Central R.R., 35 N.Y. 210, 217 (1866). Accord, BERGSTROM, 
COURTING DANGER, supra note 13, at 172. 
16 158 N.Y. 73 (1899).  
17 Id. at 102. 
18 87 N.Y.S. 670 (App. Div. 1904), aff’d on opinion below, 183 N.Y. 553 (1906). 
19 Id. at 671.  
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been the victim of a lamentable accident; but it is attributable, as it 
seems to me, not to any fault of the defendants, but rather to the hasty 
carelessness of a third person, over whose movements and conduct 
they had no control.”20 
By the opening decades of the twentieth century, however, 
classical judicial doctrine could no longer claim to be the only 
plausible approach to issues of causation in tort.  Randolph Bergstrom, 
whose valuable book on New York tort litigation covers a forty-year 
period almost immediately prior to the period here under study, shows 
that a competing “popular conception of liability” was emerging 
slowly in the years around and after the turn of the century.  The 
evidence available to Bergstrom did not permit him to elaborate this 
popular paradigm in detail, but there can be little doubt, in view of a 
growing tendency of jury verdicts to diverge from judges’ views and 
of the hostile reaction of judges and leaders of the bar to the 
divergence, that a competing paradigm existed and disturbed 
profoundly those adhering to the traditional one.21  In the words of 
Judge M. Bruce Linn, for example, the law was “menaced by those 
who would completely transform it,” with “no regard for its history; 
no reverence for its traditions; no conception of its obligations; and no 
appreciation for its ideals,”22 while Judge William Hornblower worried 
about the frequency with which juries “yield[ed] to local sentiment . . . 
[producing] erroneous decisions in accordance with the popular idea 
of the demands of justice.”23 
This new “popular conception of liability . . . was never clearly 
articulated” by its proponents,24 at least in part because the juries which 
administered it could speak only through general verdicts.  The best 
efforts at definition thus came from the mouths of lawyers who 
opposed the new view.  Clearest of all, though guilty of exaggeration, 
was Eli Hammond, who wrote that the new popular conception was 
“in favor of looting any public or quasi-public treasury in aid of private 
suffering or private want.”25 The distinguished Elihu Root believed 
 
20 Id. 
21 BERGSTROM, COURTING DANGER, supra note 13, at 142-43, 166, 171-78. 
22 M. BRUCE LINN, THE LAWYER AN OFFICER OF THE COURT: A LECTURE BEFORE THE 
STUDENTS OF THE ALBANY LAW SCHOOL 15 (Albany: Albany Law School, 1912), quoted in 
BERGSTROM, COURTING DANGER, supra note 13, at 173. 
23 William B. Hornblower, New York State Bar Association Minutes, American Lawyer, 1 
(1893), 49, quoted in BERGSTROM, COURTING DANGER, supra note 13, at 171. 
24 BERGSTROM, COURTING DANGER, supra note 13, at 172. 
25 Quoted in BERGSTROM, COURTING DANGER, supra note 13, at 171 n.12. 
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that “[d]istorted and exaggerated conceptions [were] disseminated by 
men . . . overexcited by contemplating unhappiness and privation 
which perhaps no law or administration could prevent,”26 and one H.T. 
Smith agreed that “[j]uries are naturally sympathetic and . . . inclined 
to take the view that an employee should be compensated when injured 
no matter what the judge tells them about the law.”27 
As juries and others adopted the new paradigm holding that 
victims of injury should receive compensation from some source, they 
simultaneously rejected the older, nineteenth-century world view that 
injury, death, and other sudden calamities were inevitable, random, 
and frequent events attributable to cosmic rather than human agency. 
Whereas nineteenth-century judges had not traced out complex chains 
of causation in order to identify the human agent most responsible for 
a disaster but had instead typically let “losses . . . lie where they fell,” 
early twentieth-century jurors “came to assign cause differently.”28 
The newly emerging tort paradigm, to quote from the findings of 
Randolph Bergstrom, contained 
an understanding of cause and effect that included a 
fuller sense of remote causation -- that actors not at the 
site of an event could create the conditions that cause 
the event. . . . The scope of the search for liability was 
pushed beyond immediate contact to outlying areas 
where those who created the conditions that caused 
injury worked. Understanding cause to spring from 
sources remote as well as immediate, New Yorkers 
brought suit over injuries from commonplace causes 
that “ordinarily were never noticed hitherto,” and that 
had previously been considered the random working of 
fate. In doing so, they defined anew the “inevitable” 
event as a compensable injury, conceiving it as the 
cause and responsibility of someone else.29 
 
26 Elihu Root, Judicial Decisions and Public Feeling: Address as President of the New York 
Bar Association at the Annual Meeting in New York City, 5, (Jan. 19, 1912) (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), quoted in BERGSTROM, COURTING DANGER, supra 
note 13, at 172-73. 
27 H.T. Smith, Liability Investigations and Adjustments, in LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION 
INSURANCE 67 (Hartford: Insurance Institute of Hartford, 1913).  
28 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE 57-59 (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 
1985).  
29 BERGSTROM, COURTING DANGER, supra note 13, at 175. 
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By 1920, these newly emerging, though not uniformly accepted 
ideas of causation and tort liability had begun to attain legitimacy even 
in judicial circles.  As a result, classical doctrine no longer provided 
easy answers in every case, and judges began to recognize that                          
issues of liability and causation involved policy choice.  Competition 
between the new and old paradigms left no doubt that determining 
when a plaintiff had “a legal right” or when a defendant had committed 
“a wrongful act” required courts to consider whether there was “a 
relationship between the parties of such a character . . . that as a matter 
of good faith and general social policy” the defendant had a duty not 
to harm the plaintiff.30 More specifically, judges came to understand 
that they had “to harmonize the necessities of a competitive industrial 
system of business with the teachings of morality”31 -- that is, they had 
to harmonize capitalism with “the sense of universal justice 
exemplified in the Golden Rule,”32 all “without too radical a departure 
from recognized legal rules.”33 
The Court of Appeals sought to work out the tension between 
the competing paradigms of liability in the pacesetting case of  
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.34  Not surprisingly, the court did not adopt 
either paradigm wholesale, but instead strove to elaborate a 
compromise position entailing recognition of the reformers’ demands 
for social justice, but only within the confines of existing precedent. 
Thus, it adhered to the traditional doctrinal approach that “some 
culpability on the part of a defendant”35 was the key factor that 
rendered conduct tortious.  At the same time, however, it defined 
culpability more expansively and thereby increased the range of cases 
in which victims of injury could obtain compensation. 
Still studied by all first-year law students under the rubric of 
proximate cause, the majority opinion in Palsgraf by Chief Judge 
Cardozo has never been examined by scholars in the context of the 
ongoing conflict between supporters of the new and supporters of the 
old paradigm of tort liability.  Such an examination suggests that 
Cardozo wrote his Palsgraf opinion with the conflict in mind, that he 
 
30 Bolivar v. Monnat, 248 N.Y.S. 722, 729 (App. Div. 1931). 
31 Rozell v. Rozell, 8 N.Y.S.2d 901, 904 (App. Div. 1939), aff’d, 281 N.Y. 106 (1939). 
32 Gould v. Flato, 10 N.Y.S.2d 361, 368 (Sup. Ct. 1938). 
33 M.L. Stewart & Co. v. Marcus, 207 N.Y.S. 685, 691 (Sup. Ct. 1924). 
34 248 N.Y. 339 (1928). 
35 Pease v. Sinclair Refining Co., 104 F.2d 183, 185 (2d Cir. 1939). 
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embraced the new paradigm, but that he also recognized a need to limit 
the range of liability to which defendants might be subjected thereby. 
The case arose when the plaintiff, Helen Palsgraf, who had 
purchased a ticket from the railroad and was waiting for a train, was 
injured through a fall of scales dislodged as a result of an explosion of 
fireworks at the other end of the station’s platform.  The explosion had 
occurred when two railroad employees had knocked a small package 
out of the hands of another passenger while helping him board a 
moving train.  The package contained the fireworks, “but there was 
nothing in its appearance to give notice of its contents.”36 
The classical understanding of negligence and proximate cause 
was elaborated by Judge Andrews in a dissent that would have 
affirmed the opinion of the Appellate Division directing judgment for 
the plaintiff.  In Andrews’s view, “[e]very one owe[d] to the world at 
large the duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably 
threaten the safety of others.”37  Negligence consisted in breach of this 
duty, and the railroad had been negligent in Palsgraf when its 
employees permitted a man to board a moving train and even assisted 
him in doing so.  But “[o]bviously,” as Judge Andrews himself had 
observed in another case, negligence liability had to have “its limits.”38 
The limit was the doctrine of proximate cause.  By virtue of 
this doctrine, negligence did not invariably give rise to a cause of 
action for damages, unless the damages were “so connected with the 
negligence that the latter may be said to be the proximate cause of                   
the former.”39  By “proximate” Andrews meant “that, because of 
convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law 
arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point,” 
not as a matter of “logic” but of “practical politics.”40  In determining 
proximate cause, it was necessary to ask questions such as “whether 
there was a natural and continuous sequence between cause and 
effect,” whether “the one was a substantial factor in producing the 
other,” and whether there was “a direct connection between them, 
without too many intervening causes.”41  For Andrews, inquiries into 
 
36 Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 341. 
37 Id. at 350 (Andrews, J., dissenting).  
38 International Products Co. v. Erie R.R., 244 N.Y. 331, 337, cert. denied, 275 U.S. 527 
(1927). 
39 Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 351 (Andrews, J., dissenting).  
40 Id. at 352.  
41 Id. at 354.  
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proximate cause always involved “question[s] of fair judgment” and 
could lead at best not to a clear rule but only to “an uncertain and 
wavering line” that would yield “practical” results “in keeping with the 
general understanding of mankind.”42 
Andrews’s language about “public policy,” “a rough sense of 
justice,” and “practical politics” was not the language of the nascent 
legal realist movement, as other scholars have suggested.43 It surely 
was not the language of sociological jurisprudence -- the language 
employed by Cardozo -- out of which realism was emerging. It would 
be two more years before the realists would break clearly from 
sociological jurisprudence and receive their name and designation as 
an intellectual movement in Karl Llewellyn’s famous article, “A 
Realistic Jurisprudence -- the Next Step.”44 Even then, legal realists 
did not often use the words quoted above that were used by Andrews. 
Andrews’s language, as I have argued elsewhere,45 was more typically 
the language of the descendants of the realists in the aftermath                                
of World War II, not the language of first-generation realists in the 
decade of the 1930s.  It makes more sense, in my view, to understand 
 
42 Id. at 350-52; 354-55. 
43 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE 
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 61 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); G. EDWARD 
WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 98-99 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1980). 
44 Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 
(1930).  N.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND & KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE 175-76 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), states that realism 
emerged during the course of a debate between Llewellyn and Pound and their friends set off 
by Llewellyn’s 1930 article. On the other hand, Laura Kalman, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 
1927-1960, 3-44 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), sees the 
emergence of legal realism as a lengthier process, stretching back into the 1920s. 
  Ultimately, one’s view of the time of realism’s origin depends on one’s definition of 
realism. In my view, realism involved more than the rejection of Langdellian conceptualism. 
The core tenet of realism was not simply that the law follows “an uncertain and wavering line” 
reflective of “public policy” and “a rough sense of justice.” Cardozo knew that, and Andrews 
knew that. So did Holmes thirty years earlier, as did most other judges. But, for Cardozo and 
Andrews, at least, the line the law followed was one “in keeping with the general 
understanding of mankind.” For later realists like Judge Charles Clark, in contrast, judicial 
decisions on issues like proximate cause depended not on society’s, but on the individual 
judge’s “values and his notions of sound and desirable social policy.” Pease v. Sinclair 
Refining Co., 104 F.2d 183, 185 (2d Cir. 1939).  
  Thus, the core tenet of realism is not that law reflects social policy but that judges make 
policy choices. Cardozo and Andrews rejected that tenet; later realists like Clark and William 
O. Douglas embraced it. As of 1930, no one had fully articulated it. 
45 See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE LEGALIST REFORMATION: LAW, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY 
IN NEW YORK, 1920-1980, 143-47 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 
2001). 
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Andrews, a conservative whom the realists never accepted as one of 
their own, to be describing conservative tort doctrine of recent decades, 
of which he was intimately aware, rather than a jurisprudential 
movement which he perhaps anticipated but which at the time of his 
writing was still in gestation. 
In addition to the Sage and Abraham cases discussed above,                  
a 1921 decision from the Second Circuit strongly supported Andrews’ 
views.46  The plaintiff was the widow of a deceased alien who had been 
arrested and imprisoned on the orders of Attorney General A. Mitchell 
Palmer.47  She alleged that her husband had been subjected to physical 
and mental torture by his federal captors until he committed suicide as 
the only means of escape.  Nonetheless, two out of the three judges 
sitting on the Second Circuit panel voted to dismiss her complaint, 
declaring that it would be “a most unreasonable inference . . . to say 
that suicidal mania can be regarded as the natural and probable 
consequence of either mental or physical torture.”48  The dissenter, in 
contrast, thought it obvious “that the infliction of such wrongs 
continuously over a long period of time might naturally and probably 
would lead to . . . self destruction.”49  However, as the dissenting judge 
further observed, the concept of “natural and probable consequence” 
over which the court was battling was a mere “expression . . . to 
explain the reason for the decision on the facts.”50 
Of course, authority also existed for the reform principle 
favored by Cardozo and the Palsgraf majority -- the principle that, 
“where one undertakes to do something involving a dangerous 
situation, he must do it with reasonable care.”51  Cardozo himself had 
taken a preliminary step toward that view in Glanzer v. Shepard,52                   
in which a public weigher who had weighed beans at the request of a 
seller was held liable to the buyer for weighing them erroneously.  As 
Cardozo explained, the “controlling circumstance” in determining 
whether or not tort liability existed was “not the character of the 
consequence” but “the thought and purposes of the actor,”53 and in 
 
46 See Salsedo v. Palmer, 278 F. 92 (2d Cir. 1921). 
47 Id. at 93.  
48 Id. at 99.  
49 Id. at 100 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting).  
50 Id. at 101.  
51 Miller v. City of Rochester, 188 N.Y.S. 334, 336 (App. Div. 1921). 
52 233 N.Y. 236 (1922).  
53 Id. at 240.  
9
Nelson: Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018
290 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 34 
Glanzer, the possibility of harm to the buyer should have been within 
the thoughts of the weigher.  Thus, the weigher was liable.54 
Writing for the Palsgraf majority, Chief Judge Cardozo 
expanded on his holding in Glanzer and further embraced the reform 
position as the underlying principle for the law of torts.  Proclaiming 
that a finding of negligence “would entail liability for any and all 
consequences, however novel or extraordinary,” the Chief Judge held 
that the doctrine of proximate cause would not limit liability as 
Andrews’ dissent suggested it had traditionally done in New York law; 
in Cardozo’s words, “[t]he law of causation, remote or proximate, is 
thus foreign to the case before us.”  When this holding was added to 
the ruling in Glanzer that liability depended on the mental state of 
actors rather than the consequences of their actions, the reform 
principle was complete.  Cardozo and a majority of the Court of 
Appeals had rendered people in positions of power responsible in 
damages if they foresaw harm resulting from their actions, however 
remote the harm might be and by whatever indirection it might be 
produced.55 
But, at the same time that Cardozo and his brethren brought                    
the reform program to fruition, they also imposed limits upon it.                         
Cardozo and his colleagues were no radicals.  They appreciated the 
uncertainties that entrepreneurs, who could always foresee harm, 
would face if they were liable in damages whenever harm, however 
remote and indirect, occurred. “Proof of negligence in the air,” 
Cardozo thus wrote, would “not do.”56  Defendants who were negligent 
would not be liable for all harms in the world, but only for damages 
suffered by those at whom their negligence was directed. 
“Negligence,” Cardozo continued, was not an open-ended concept, but 
“a term of relation,” pursuant to which “[t]he plaintiff sue[d] in her 
own right for a wrong personal to her, and not as the vicarious 
 
54 Id. at 240-42. Glanzer was later read as support for a far-reaching rule that “a negligent 
statement may be the basis for a recovery of damages,” International Products Co. v. Erie R.R., 
244 N.Y. 331, 337 (1927), and that rule, in turn, was held to permit a damage suit by an 
African-American who purchased a bus ticket from Buffalo, New York to Montgomery, 
Alabama on an oral assurance of the ticket agent that he would not be discriminated against 
on the basis of his race. See Battle v. Central Greyhound Lines, Inc., 13 N.Y.S.2d 357 (Sup. 
Ct. 1939). 
55 Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 346. Note should be taken of the parallelism between Cardozo’s 
rulings in Glanzer and Palsgraf, on the one hand, and MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 
N.Y. 382 (1916), on the other. 
56 Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 341.  
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beneficiary of a breach of duty to another.”57  Cardozo concluded that 
no negligence had occurred toward the plaintiff and hence she could 
not recover damages for her injury since, at least “to the eye of ordinary 
vigilance,” the act of helping a passenger onto a moving train was 
“innocent and harmless . . . with reference to her.”58 
In cases before and after Palsgraf, the Court of Appeals 
elaborated the rule that in order “[t]o be negligent, a defendant must 
have acted or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary reasonable 
man would have realized that certain interests of certain persons were 
unreasonably subjected to a general but definite class of risks.”59 
Conversely, a person could not “be held liable in negligence for failing 
to provide against a danger he could not have reasonably foreseen.”60  
In a case decided in the same month as Palsgraf, the Court of Appeals, 
with only Andrews in dissent, wrote that “[n]egligence is gauged by 
the ability to anticipate.”61 “The risk reasonably to be perceived 
define[d] the duty to be obeyed.”62 The “one fundamental rule,” 
according to still another opinion from which only Andrews dissented, 
was “that the act of a party sought to be charged is not to be regarded 
as a proximate cause . . . unless it could have been reasonably 
anticipated that the consequences complained of would result from the 
alleged wrongful act.”63 
In light of this principle, the court decided cases such as 
Wagner v. International Ry.,64 where it found a railroad liable to a 
plaintiff who had gone upon a trestle to rescue his cousin, who had 
fallen from a train; the reasoning, in another famous Cardozo opinion, 
was that “[d]anger invites rescue.”65  Since a rescue attempt was 
“within the range of the natural and probable” and hence foreseeable 
reactions to the possible peril of an injured man lying on railroad 
tracks, the court held the railroad liable when the person attempting the 
rescue was injured.66 
 
57 Id. at 342.  
58 Id. at 341-42, 345. 
59 Payne v. City of New York, 277 N.Y. 393, 396 (1938). 
60 Id. 
61 McGlone v. William Angus, Inc., 248 N.Y. 197, 199 (1928). 
62 Storm v. New York Telephone Co., 270 N.Y. 103, 108-09 (1930). 
63 Saugerties Bank v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 236 N.Y. 425, 430 (1923). 
64 232 N.Y. 176 (1921).  
65 Id. at 180.  
66 Id.  
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Of course, damage remained “the very gist and essence of the 
plaintiff’s cause,” and that damage had to flow “from an infraction of 
a duty, to the injured party, from an invasion of his legal rights,” in 
order for “legal liability” to be imposed.67  There could “be no 
actionable negligence in the absence of a legal duty to the plaintiffs.”68 
And, determining the scope of citizens’ duties to each other was a 
difficult matter which could not “be tested by pure logic.”69 
There were some matters on which the New York courts 
reached agreement.  They agreed that citizens were under no duty to 
provide assistance to each other, but that they came under a duty if they 
volunteered to provide help or entered into a contractual relationship.70 
Indeed, a duty arising out of a contract could sometimes “inure to a 
third person”71 -- someone other than a party to the contract -- “under 
certain circumstances.”72  What, however, were those circumstances? 
When would a water company that had made a contract with a city to 
provide water to its residents be liable to them for damage resulting 
from a failure to provide the water?  When would an accountant who 
had audited a firm’s books be liable to a person who had lent money 
to the firm in reliance on the audit? 
Cardozo addressed these questions in two leading opinions: 
H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co.73 and Ultramares Corp. v. 
Touche.74  His concern was that the “field of obligation” not “be 
expanded beyond reasonable limits.”75  Although “[t]he assault upon 
the citadel of privity” -- of tort upon contract -- was “proceeding . . . 
apace,”76 Cardozo was unwilling to expose contracting parties to “the 
involuntary assumption of a series of new relations, inescapably 
hooked together” and thus “to a liability in an indeterminate amount 
for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class,”77 all out of 
concern that the “hazards of a business conducted on these terms” 
 
67 Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 235 (1931). 
68 Gambon v. City of New York, 271 N.Y.S. 244, 248 (Sup. Ct. 1934). 
69 Comstock, 257 N.Y. at 234-35.  
70 Zelenko v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 287 N.Y.S. 134 (Sup. Ct. 1935), aff’d, 287 N.Y.S. 136 
(App. Div. 1936). 
71 Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Weinberg, 181 N.Y.S. 15 (App. Term 1920), aff’d, 188 N.Y.S. 
610 (App. Div. 1921). 
72 Harriman v. N.Y., Chi. & St. Louis R.R. Co., 253 N.Y. 398 (1930). 
73 247 N.Y. 160 (1928). 
74 255 N.Y. 170 (1931). 
75 H.R. Moch Co., 247 N.Y. at 164. 
76 Ultramares Corp., 255 N.Y. at 180. 
77 H.R. Moch Co., 247 N.Y. at 168. 
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would be too “extreme.”78  He was unwilling, in short, to permit large 
business entities to become vehicles for the redistribution of their 
shareholders’ and customers’ wealth to random sufferers of damage 
whose susceptibility thereto could not have been specifically foreseen 
and prevented; he was prepared to impose liability only on those who 
callously let others get hurt. 
Keeping true to Palsgraf, Cardozo held that in the absence of 
“reckless and wanton indifference to consequences measured and 
foreseen”79 or of “reckless misstatement . . . or insincere profession of 
opinion . . . liability for negligence . . . [would be] bounded by the 
contract.”80  Whether a defendant had acted insincerely or recklessly 
toward individuals who might be damaged by its negligent 
performance of a contract so as to become liable to them in tort 
presented a question of fact for juries and for future divisions on the 
Court of Appeals, the precise outcome of which could not readily be 
predicted.81 
Despite the difficulties involved in its application in borderline 
cases such as Moch and Ultramares, the foreseeability standard 
elaborated by the Palsgraf majority and numerous other New York 
cases during the 1920s and 1930s had significant doctrinal 
consequences in comparison with the alternative articulated by the 
Palsgraf dissent. 
A first consequence was to give juries less freedom than the 
approach of Judge Andrews in dissent might have allowed.82 After 
allowing a jury first to inquire whether the defendant had committed 
an act that “unreasonably threaten[ed] the safety of others,” Andrews 
next required the jury to make a “fair judgment” about where to “draw 
an uncertain and wavering line” marking the point where “because of 
 
78 Ultramares Corp., 255 N.Y. at 179-80. 
79 H.R. Moch Co., 247 N.Y. at 169. 
80 Ultramares Corp., 255 N.Y. at 190. 
81 State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104 (1938). 
82 Normally Cardozo favored the empowerment of juries. His position in Palsgraf was not, 
in fact, inconsistent. He normally favored giving power to juries in contexts where jury power 
would assist plaintiffs; in Palsgraf, Andrews sought to give juries which had already decided 
the preliminary issue of wrongdoing in favor of plaintiffs the additional issue of proximate 
cause, which they could then resolve in favor of defendants. Moreover, it is not clear that 
Andrews, despite the language of his opinion, truly intended to let juries pass on the policy 
questions implicit in the proximate cause issue; given the extensive body of precedent that 
existed in New York, he may have expected judges to take proximate cause issues away from 
juries and rule on them as a matter of law. If such was Andrews’s expectation, then Cardozo’s 
Palsgraf approach was more empowering of juries. 
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convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law 
arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point.”83 
In performing these tasks, juries would not have recourse to facts or 
“logic,” but would be engaging in “practical politics.”84  In contrast, 
the approach of Cardozo and most New York judges pointed juries to 
a coherent factual inquiry -- did the defendant know or have reason to 
know that its activities posed a risk of injury to the plaintiff or to the 
class of people of which the plaintiff was a member.  This standard, 
which did not involve any “balance of probabilities” but only “the 
existence of some probability of sufficient moment to induce action to 
avoid it,” was a simple test that did not empower juries or judges to 
make any practical political decisions or other balancing judgments.85 
A second consequence of the Cardozo approach was an almost 
total absence of mention in the cases of today’s popular calculus of risk 
standard, detailed by Learned Hand in the 1947 case of United States 
v. Carroll Towing Co.86  By not encouraging juries to balance the 
foreseeability of injury against the utility of the defendant’s conduct, 
New York law during the 1920s and 1930s largely avoided utilitarian 
cost-benefit analysis as part of the negligence determination. During 
the two decades in question, New York negligence law almost 
uniformly was not utilitarian.  It remained committed only to the cause 
of social justice, although there were alternative views about the 
meaning of justice: on the one hand, a commitment that “sympathy” 
not become a “basis of transferring the property of one party to 
another,”87 and on the other hand, a simple moral insight that it was the 
obligation of those who used “people . . . for gain and profit, to be 
vigilant in their efforts to protect such people.”88 
A federal admiralty case, The No. 1 of New York,89 uniquely 
emphasizes the nonutilitarian character of New York doctrine.  In The 
No. 1 of New York, a New York City drawbridge operator who had 
 
83 Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 347-52 (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
84 Id. at 350-55.  
85 Pease v. Sinclair Refining Co., 104 F.2d 183, 186 (2d Cir. 1939). Of course, difficult 
issues could arise at the edges when it became necessary to determine whether a plaintiff was 
a member of the class on which risk was imposed or whether the injury was of the nature 
which the defendant should have anticipated. See, e.g., Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 
F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1965). 
86 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).  
87 Laidlaw, 158 N.Y. at 104. 
88 Schubert v. Hotel Astor, Inc., 5 N.Y.S.2d 203, 207 (Sup. Ct. 1938), aff’d, 8 N.Y.S.2d 567 
(App. Div. 1938), aff’d, 281 N.Y. 597 (1939).  
89 61 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1932).  
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opened a bridge for a tug and its tow then closed it to permit fire 
engines to pass, with the result that one of the barges in tow collided 
with the bridge.  The court held that “a bridge owner” who had once 
opened a bridge could “not withdraw his consent to the passage, even 
in the exigency of a demand by fire apparatus responding to an alarm, 
at a time when withdrawal should be foreseen as endangering the 
vessel.”90  The noteworthy fact about this opinion is that the court, 
consisting of Judge Swan and the two Hand cousins, never asked what 
seemed quite likely -- whether the harm that would have been done by 
not allowing the fire engines to pass outweighed the harm that occurred 
to the barge.  All that mattered was that the bridge operator, having 
undertaken a duty to the tug and its tow, could not fail to perform that 
duty even when it could foresee that greater harm would result from 
its failure. 
Only one federal case, Sinram v. Pennsylvania R.R.,91 cannot 
be reconciled with the New York mainstream.  On the issue whether a 
tug which rammed and damaged an empty barge above the waterline 
was liable for loss of a subsequently loaded cargo of coal which caused 
the barge to take on water through the damaged area and thereafter to 
sink, Judge Learned Hand declared that “we are not bound to take 
thought for all that the morrow may bring, even though we should 
foresee it.”92  Although a tug operator who thought enough about “the 
precise train of events” that might follow a collision would have 
foreseen the sinking, the foreseeability “canon,” according to Hand, 
was “more equivocal than appears on the surface,” and “ignore[d] the 
excuses for much conduct . . . likely to involve damage to others.”93  
Duties, Hand continued, were “a resultant not only of what we should 
forecast, but of the propriety of disregarding so much of it as our own 
interests justify us in putting at risk.”94 
Since Sinram was decided the same day by the same 
unanimous three-judge panel that resolved The No. 1 of New York, it 
is difficult to interpret it as an explicit, early statement of the calculus 
of risk standard later put forward by Hand in Carroll Towing.  Hand 
did not totally reject the Palsgraf principle of liability for all 
foreseeable harm. At most, Sinram implied that a tug operator’s 
 
90 Id. at 784. 
91 61 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1932). 
92 Id. at 771. 
93 Id. 
94 Id.   
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interest in getting its job done quickly and efficiently outweighed the 
costs of theoretically foreseeable but highly improbable accidents, 
such as the one that had occurred when the damaged barge was loaded 
without any inspection for potential leaks.  In any event, while                   
Sinram may have anticipated the calculus of risk standard, it was a 
unique case prior to the 1940s.  And, its author was an unusually 
prescient judge who, perhaps because of his life-tenure appointment 
on the federal bench, did not participate in the reform effort of state 
judges like Cardozo, but instead agreed with the conservatives that it 
was “monstrous” to “ruin a man for a momentary dereliction” by 
“attribut[ing] to an act every consequence which is likely to result.”95 
Except for this prescient opinion by Hand, Andrews’s equally 
prescient dissent in Palsgraf, and Cardozo’s acquiescence in 
contractual limitations on tort liability, New York tort theory by the 
late 1920s reflected, on the whole, the reform view that people who 
intended harm to others or who acted toward others in ways which they 
foresaw would produce harm were liable for any harm they brought 
about.  If harm to others was either intended or foreseen, no interest               
on the part of an actor -- however strong that interest might be --                  
would justify a refusal to pay damages for infliction of the harm.  Only 
if harm was neither intended nor reasonably foreseeable was it not 
compensable. 
By so depriving those who administered tort law of the capacity 
to engage in balancing and instead tying them to a strict principle of 
moral obligation, the New York reformers sought to insure that classes 
of people within the ordinary bounds of foreseeability, such as 
workers, consumers of most products, and people on public highways, 
would recover damages when they suffered injury. They thereby 
transformed the doctrine of proximate cause, which had been a 
 
95 American Law Institute, Torts Conference Minutes, I, 39-43, quoted in ANDREW L. 
KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 290-91 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998).  Balancing 
the utility of conduct against the risk of harm to which it might lead was not novel in 
contributory negligence cases; in New York, it dated back at least to the nineteenth century 
case of Eckert v. Long Island R.R., 43 N.Y. 502 (1871). Moreover, reasons of policy called for 
cost-benefit analysis in contributory negligence while prohibiting it in negligence. Declaring 
people contributorily negligent for taking risks warranted by self-interest would have 
interfered excessively with individual freedom of choice, but holding them negligent for 
profiting from risks they imposed on others merely made them pay for their callousness. For 
these reasons, the use of cost-benefit analysis in contributory negligence cases was easily 
reconcilable with the general tendency of New York law during the 1920s and 1930s to impose 
tort liability on those who intended to impose or foresaw that they would impose harm on 
another. 
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discretionary political principle that conservative judges had used in a 
wide range of cases to set aside jury verdicts awarding damages against 
wealthy and powerful entrepreneurs, into an incomprehensible rule 
applicable only in weird cases.  While insuring entrepreneurs that they 
would not be liable in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate 
time to an indeterminate class merely by conducting business, the New 
York reformers did their best to make tort law consistent with popular 
conceptions of justice, which had emerged in the early twentieth 
century, that victims of injury should recover damages from those who 
had created the conditions that had caused them to be hurt. 
Much specific tort doctrine conformed during the 1920s and 
1930s almost precisely to the culpability standard of Palsgraf.  Product 
liability law was one such body of doctrine.  The then recently decided 
case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,96 which held a manufacturer 
liable to a purchaser of its product for negligent defects that had 
foreseeably led to injury, even when the purchaser had obtained the 
product through a retail dealer and thus was not in privity of contract 
with the manufacturer, was followed in several cases during the two 
decades under analysis.  Indeed, in one case, which held manufacturers 
of component parts liable to consumers for injuries caused by defects 
in the final manufactured product, the MacPherson rule was even 
extended.97 
In its adherence, however, to the culpability standard later 
codified in Palsgraf, MacPherson applied only to products “inherently 
beset with danger and . . . reasonably certain to imperil life or limb if 
carelessly made,”98 not to products where “injury was [merely] a 
possible consequence of the defective construction,” but “not a 
probable result.”99 A manufacturer could “not be charged with 
negligence where some unusual result” occurred that could not 
“reasonably be foreseen” and was “not within the compass of 
reasonable probability.”100 
Other limitations on MacPherson were also consistent with the 
underlying purposes of the Court of Appeals in Palsgraf.  For example, 
 
96 217 N.Y. 382 (1916). 
97 See Genesee County Patrons Fire Relief Ass’n v. Sonneborn Sons, Inc., 263 N.Y. 463 
(1934). Accord, Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 259 N.Y. 292 (1932). 
98 Creedon v. Automatic Voting Machine Corp., 276 N.Y.S. 609, 611 (App. Div. 1935), 
aff’d, 268 N.Y. 583 (1935). 
99 Cook v. A. Garside & Sons, Inc., 259 N.Y.S. 947, 948 (Sup. Ct. 1932). 
100 Boyd v. American Can Co., 291 N.Y.S. 205 (App. Div. 1936), aff’d, 274 N.Y. 526 
(1937). 
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the limitation that the MacPherson rule applied only to suits involving 
physical injuries and not to commercial loss101 fit well with the 
underlying goals of tort reformers, who sought to protect workers, 
consumers, and highway users, but not business entrepreneurs.                    
A second limitation -- that the rule applied only to claims of negligence 
and not to suits for breach of warranty, where privity of contract 
between consumer and manufacturer was still required102 -- similarly 
reflected  Cardozo’s concerns in Moch and Ultramares that the “field 
of obligation” not “be expanded beyond reasonable limits”103 and that 
contracting parties not be exposed to “the involuntary assumption of a 
series of new relations, inescapably hooked together,” since the 
“hazards of a business conducted on these terms” would be too 
“extreme.”104 
General negligence law was also consistent with Palsgraf, its 
controlling authority.  In any negligence case, “the burden rest[ed] 
upon the plaintiff to show by a fair preponderance of the evidence” that 
an “accident was caused by the fault of defendant.”105 The most notable 
exception to the ordinary requirement that plaintiffs provide evidence 
of fault occurred with the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which allowed 
negligence to be proved by less than “positive and direct evidence,” 
when “circumstances” could be “shown” from which a “reasonable 
inference” could be drawn that an “injury resulted from negligent 
acts.”106  Ultimately, res ipsa loquitur advanced the new tort paradigm 
advocated by reformers -- namely, that a defendant not be permitted to 
“carry on its undertaking without making good any loss that occurs to 
the business or property of another”107 and that no one be allowed 
“rightly [to] levy toll upon the legal rights of others” by carelessly and 
callously advancing his or her own interests.108 
Cardozo and other judges also advanced the cause of tort 
reformers with their holdings concerning the weight to be accorded to 
 
101 See A.J.P. Contracting Corp. V. Brooklyn Bakers Supply Co., 15 N.Y.S.2d 424 (App. 
Div. 1939), aff’d, 283 N.Y. 692 (1940). 
102 See Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468 (1923). 
103 H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 164, 166 (1928). 
104 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 179-80 (1931). 
105 Lane v. City of Buffalo, 250 N.Y.S. 579, 582 (App. Div. 1931). 
106 Warner v. New York, O. & W.R.R., 204 N.Y.S. 607, 609 (App. Div. 1924), aff’d, 239 
N.Y. 507 (1924). 
107 Loesberg v. Fraad, 197 N.Y.S. 229, 232 (Mun. Ct. 1922). 
108 Rochester Gas & Electric Co. v. Dunlop, 266 N.Y.S. 469, 473 (County Ct. 1933). 
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statutes.  The basic rule, laid down by Cardozo in Martin v. Herzog,109 
was that breach of a statute is “more than some evidence of negligence. 
It is negligence in itself.”110 This rule, which was reiterated in many 
cases,111 reflected the extreme deference of New York judges during 
the 1920s and 1930s to legislative alterations of the usually pro-
business rules of the common law.  The consequence of the rule was 
that, whenever reformers had sufficient political success to obtain 
enactment of legislation on their behalf, they could count on the ready 
translation of that success into results in individual cases. 
Thus, much change occurred in New York tort law during the 
1920s and 1930s as judges announced their preference for an emerging 
reform paradigm of tort liability, which held that victims of injury 
should receive compensation from some source, rather than the 
traditional paradigm, which permitted compensation to be paid only 
when a person was injured directly by another’s wrongful act.  But we 
must not overestimate the extent of change.  Led by Cardozo, the New 
York judiciary did not favor the new paradigm completely, but instead 
strove to accommodate both paradigms.  Cardozo, in particular, seems 
to have wanted both to preserve the fairness values underlying the 
traditional paradigm while simultaneously incorporating significant 
elements of the reform program into the body of New York case law. 
Even so, it seems clear that, to the extent that courts 
reconsidered particular legal doctrines, they tended to favor the newer 
reform values rather than the older traditional ones, even if they did 
not adopt the new values in their entirety.  The direction of doctrinal 
development in New York’s personal injury law during the 1920s and 
1930s was toward the reform program and away from classic 
nineteenth century values.  However, as a result of the doctrine of stare 
decisis, which meant that in the absence of explicit reexamination old 
law remained in place, litigants continued to confront mostly 
nineteenth century rules. Whatever changes occurred as a result of the 
efforts of reformers, they were overwhelmed in the larger picture of 
1920s and 1930s by established rules, dealing with assumption of 
 
109 228 N.Y. 164 (1920).   
110 Id. at 168 (emphasis in original).  
111 For one reiteration, see Tedla v. Ellman, 280 N.Y. 124, 131 (1939) (dictum). 
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risk,112 contributory negligence,113 tort liability of landowners,114 and 
joint and vicarious liability,115 which remained in place through sheer 
inertia.  These established rules all continued to reflect the traditional 
paradigm’s concern that people be held responsible only for harms 
they had directly caused. 
In short, personal injury law during the era of Cardozo entered 
upon a process of change, but it was not completely transformed. 
Judges with conservative sympathies, like Andrews and Hand, 
continued to elaborate theories of liability which, in the short term, 
were largely ignored but which, in later decades, would be widely 
endorsed.  Reformers frequently placed their imprint on specific 
doctrines for which they could obtain judicial reconsideration, but 
much old doctrine, which reflected nineteenth-century assumptions of 
limited liability, remained unexamined. Thus, personal injury law at 
the end of the 1930s remained what it had been three decades                   
earlier -- a battleground between conservative and reform agendas. 
 
 
112 On assumption of risk, see Dougherty v. Pratt Institute, 244 N.Y. 111 (1926).  
113 On contributory negligence, see Camardo v. New York State Ry., 247 N.Y. 111 (1928). 
There were occasional ameliorations of the rule that contributory negligence totally barred a 
plaintiff’s recovery, such as the doctrine of last clear chance, see Dino v. Eastern Glass Co., 
246 N.Y.S. 306 (App. Div. 1930), and the statutory rule transforming contributory negligence 
into comparative negligence in FELA cases. See Caldine v. Unadilla Valley Ry., 246 N.Y. 365 
(1927), rev’d on other grounds, 278 U.S. 139 (1928). 
114 On liability of landowners, see Miller v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 262 N.Y. 107 (1933). 
115 On joint liability, the basic starting rule was that “a person [was] responsible only for his 
own torts.” Hennessy v. Walker, 279 N.Y. 94, 98 (1938). There were exceptions to this general 
rule, however, although they were construed narrowly during the 1920s and 1930s. The first 
exception arose in “[t]he case of master and servant,” where “the negligence of the servant, 
while acting within the scope of his employment, [was] imputable to the master.” Dunne v. 
Contenti, 4 N.Y.S.2d 148, 150 (Sup. Ct. 1938), aff’d, 9 N.Y.S.2d 248 (App. Div. 1939). The 
second exception occurred when two or more people had control over an instrumentality and 
both acted negligently in operating it or when the negligence of two or more people otherwise 
“concurred in contributing to the accident.” Murphy v. Rochester Telephone Co., 203 N.Y.S. 
669, 672 (App. Div. 1924), aff’d, 240 N.Y. 629 (1925). Then all or both might be liable. 
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